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Abstract 
This paper departs from the debate on the Just City and asks what the democratic foundations of 
such a city would look like. In an effort to integrate advancements in urban research and democracy 
research, I propose a comparative framework for identifying favourable institutional arrangements 
for democratic planning processes potentially contributing to just planning outcomes. It is 
hypothesized that vertical and horizontal consensual power sharing institutions, complemented with 
a strong mayor and broadly mobilizing participatory arrangements, are best suited for protecting and 
empowering deprived population groups in a broad range of planning domains – from local 
redevelopment and municipal planning to the achievement of collective action at the metropolitan 
level. Future comparative case studies will show whether particular institutions and their 
configurations actually shape planning processes in ways that are essential for approaching the ideal 
of the Just City. 
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1. Introduction: the Just City debate 
Globally competing city regions are shaping the daily life of an increasing share of the world’s 
population. More than half of the world’s population depends on the economic opportunities 
offered in urban regions, while being affected by available housing, commuting ways, available 
means of public transportation, health and social services, schools and day-care structures, 
opportunities for leisure and socialization, and the quality of the environment. At the same time, it is 
in globally competing city regions that social and cultural differences are particularly pronounced and 
where the population size and complexity of governance at multiple levels make effective political 
involvement of all population groups seem unlikely. In fact, many people wonder whether their 
municipal and regional governments are actually responding to the needs of the broader population 
or rather to the interests of particular segments of the population, business sectors and international 
investors. 
It is against this background that an invigorated debate among urban scholars has emerged: the 
debate on 'the Just City'. In her book with the same title, Susan Fainstein (2010) departs from a 
Rawlsian liberal concept of justice and discusses its applicability in the context of urban planning at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century in the wealthy, Western world. Equity, as her preferred 
criterion of justice, then refers to "a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived 
from public policy that does not favour those who are already better off at the beginning" (Fainstein 
2010, 36). As this approach to justice can be criticized for being too individualistic, Fainstein 
supplements the criterion of equity with the poststructuralist criterion of recognition, giving 
attention to group differences that go beyond social classes and encompass race, ethnicity, gender, 
religion, and culture. She agrees with Iris M. Young that "group differentiation is both an inevitable 
and desirable aspect of modern social processes", and that "social justice … requires not the melting 
away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences 
without oppression" (cited in Fainstein 2010, 43). Fainstein then amplifies her concept of justice by 
Sen and Nussbaum's capabilities approach. Necessary capabilities for the development of each 
individual encompass non-tradable and consciously valued (if not used) opportunities regarding 
quality of life, health, bodily integrity, access to education and control over one's political and 
material environment (Fainstein 2010, 55).  
Fainstein (2010, 77–80, 7) then first raises equity issues that are involved in housing and urban 
regeneration policies, acknowledging that public transportation policies and education policies are 
considered to have strong equity implications as well. Whereas US housing policies after World War 
II were characterized by encouraging home ownership in the suburbs and stigmatizing low-income 
occupants in public housing, European national governments invested in mass-produced rental 
housing for large proportions of the working class. By the beginning of the twenty-first century public 
housing on both continents was increasingly replaced through mixed-income developments and – in 
the case of Europe – non-profit or cooperative forms of housing. Also rent supplements have been 
introduced, leaving the recipient greater choice, provided there are units available and there is no 
discrimination by the owners. And while private homeownership for the poor in the US had 
disastrous consequences in the mortgage crisis, the governments of UK and France have eliminated 
tax deductions for homeownership because of its regressive effect on fiscal redistribution. 
The field of urban regeneration is seen as tightly linked to housing policies (Fainstein 2010, 80–82). 
The extent to which redevelopment zones are designated for residential use as well as locational 
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choices for new social housing or mixed-use developments determine who will benefit from the 
redevelopment programmes. Urban regeneration have usually led to repetitive conflicts between 
growth and equity: 'downtown versus the neighbourhoods', 'demolition versus preservation', 
'community stability versus population change', 'subsidized sports facilities versus investments in 
social housing, education, or community facilities', 'expressways versus public transit'. Reconciliation 
between growth and equity through investment in human capital is seen as hampered by the 
incentives of elected politicians to favour visible hard expenditures over long term soft investments. 
Recognition of urban diversity has become a supplementing criterion of urban justice, more so in an 
era of massive migration into urban areas around the world (Fainstein 2010, 68). Linking recognition 
with justice requires equal rights to city space and that population groups with different life styles 
can enjoy public spaces designed for their preferred uses without limiting access for other population 
groups (Fainstein 2010, 69, 72). Planning diverse communities, however, is cautioned when the same 
diverse mixed-use developments are replicated by global developers or when forced relocation or 
fostered insertion of low-income or minority people to better situated neighbourhoods or suburbs 
means that community ties are disrupted and the receiving community remains hostile. Thus while 
ghettoes as involuntary spatial concentrations of a particular population group are obstructive of 
equity and community, homogeneous ethnic enclaves  as "sanctuaries for cultural difference" can 
contribute to diversity and recognition at the metropolitan level (Fainstein 2010, 71–76).  
Based on case study materials, she ends up with a list of principles to direct and evaluate urban 
planning policies conducive to a more equitable city. For instance, "all new housing development 
should provide units for households with incomes below the median, either on-site or elsewhere, 
with the goal of providing a decent home and suitable living environment for everyone" (Fainstein 
2010, 172–173). Or: "Households or businesses should not be involuntarily relocated for the purpose 
of obtaining economic development or community balance." And: "Reconstruction of neighborhoods 
should be conducted incrementally so that interim space is available in the vicinity for displaced 
households who wish to remain in the same location." Moreover, "megaprojects should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny, be required to provide direct benefits to low-income people in the form of 
employment provisions, public amenities, and a living wage." And lastly: "Fares for intracity transit 
(but not commuter rail) should be kept very low [as] low-income people are disproportionately 
reliant on public transit." 
By elaborating these substantive criteria of just planning outcomes for directing planners and 
advocacy groups, Fainstein (2010, 19) explicitly aims at counterbalancing the overly procedural 
accounts of discursive planning, negotiation and democratic decision making that have become 
dominant within planning theory. Even if she believes that justice can be seen as the consensual 
outcome of deliberation in a hypothetical ideal speech situation, she contends that sincerity, truth-
telling, and rationality would never be met on the ground (Fainstein 2010, 13). In a capitalist society 
where resources are privately owned and controlled, communicative planning will not fundamentally 
challenge existing power relations, and conflicts of interests and pre-existing social structures will 
block consensus building (Fainstein 2010, 28). It is not clear to her, why "reasoned discussion will 
produce just outcomes without any predetermined program indicating the content of justice or 
designating which participants in the discussion hold the moral high ground" (Fainstein 2010, 29). 
Participatory mechanisms have become a vehicle for middle-class interests, thereby democratizing 
bureaucratic planning processes but not in the direction of redistribution. Moreover, the legitimacy 
of neighbourhood activists claiming to represent a broad constituency has always been suspect, and 
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if they are not backed by widespread mobilization they are unlikely to make a difference (Fainstein 
2010, 66–67). 
Democratic theory more broadly has, in her view, failed to show how to ensure "adequate 
representation of all interests in a large, socially divided group, protecting against demagoguery, 
achieving more than token public participation, preventing economically or institutionally powerful 
interests from defining the agenda, and maintaining minority rights" (Fainstein 2010, 29). If politics in 
culturally divided societies is based on coalitions, she argues, how can we expect social emancipation 
to come from a "coalition of out-groups that share little but their antagonism to the extant social 
hierarchy?" (Fainstein 2010, 52). Social programmes, she concludes, depend on a combination of 
pressure from below, political-bureaucratic receptiveness at national and local level, and 
majoritarian support by the broader public and by centre-left coalitions in the case of Europe. 
Accordingly, social programmes and redevelopment policies were often based on coalitions involving 
down-town business and conservative segments of the population, resulting in suburbanization and 
further segregation (Fainstein 2010, 167–168). 
An encompassing debate on Fainstein's concept of the Just City is documented in the edited volume 
Searching for the Just City (Marcuse u. a. 2009). Frank Fischer engages in a reconciliation of her 
normative aim of social justice with the approach of discursive planning. The communicative 
approach urges planners to critically reflect on their own ways of arguing and on hidden forms of 
communicative power. While most planning practices are indeed limited to the level of technical 
assessments, deliberation on social justice would include a higher level discourse on broader societal 
impacts and alternative social systems. Peter Marcuse (2009, 95) takes another stance by criticizing 
Fainstein's concept for "accepting the existing structures, laws, and institutions as given", thus 
neglecting the power structures that lead to injustice in the first place. Alternatively, affected people 
might enjoy a right for decent living and decent work, community-based interests and decision-
making processes might be formally binding on development, private property rights might be seen 
as endowed with a social purpose, and city agencies dealing with economic growth might be limited 
by other municipal agencies dealing with education, incomes, environment and family welfare 
(Marcuse 2009, 97–98). The legitimacy of existing planning practices thus needs to be challenged, 
placing those in power in the defensive position of justifying their approaches.  
Although the debate on the Just City involves many more issues, such as the 'right to the city' and the 
question to what extent redistribution and recognition is possible under capitalism (Harvey und 
Potter 2009), it becomes clear from this short review that the discussion on the institutional 
democratic foundations for just urban planning outcomes has either been limited to participatory 
processes and the role of planners, or remained extremely vague and fragmentary with regard to the 
broader democratic institutional framework. Yet improving our understanding of how democratic 
institutions mediate planning processes and their outcomes might help orienting urban institutional 
reforms towards the goal of the Just City. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to such a research program by proposing a comparative 
framework for identifying favourable institutional arrangements for democratic planning processes 
potentially contributing to just planning outcomes. The next section first systematizes the several 
dimensions of institutional variation in the urban context. Section three then presents a first draft of 
our comparative framework for relating democratic and just planning processes to the institutional 
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setting within a particular urban region. The comparative framework will be taken as a starting point 
for future comparative case studies, as is briefly outlined in the concluding section. 
2. Democratic institutions in the urban context 
The here developed comparative framework is heavily based on a completed European research 
project exploring how cities in different institutional settings and with different political cultures 
combine leadership and community involvement for initiating, planning and implementing projects 
aiming at fostering social inclusion and/or economic competitiveness (Haus, Heinelt, and Stewart 
2005; Heinelt, Sweeting, and Getimis 2006). The research team employed sophisticated typologies of 
centre-local relations, government systems, types of leadership, and institutional designs for 
community involvement (Bäck 2005; Getimis und Grigoriadou 2005; Klausen und Sweeting 2005). As 
in our case the focus is on the institutional foundations of democratic planning processes and just 
planning outcomes within cities and city regions, the framework will be expanded to include 
governance institutions at the metropolitan level. Moreover, as consensus democracy is often 
associated with "kinder and gentler" outcomes (Lijphart 1999), for our purposes it appears 
convenient to introduce newer adaptations of Arend Lijphart's typology that have emerged for 
describing power sharing institutions that are relevant for municipalities and metropolitan regions. 
The following subsections will thus summarize existing typologies under the headings 'vertical power 
sharing institutions', 'horizontal power sharing institutions', 'types of urban leadership', and 
'participatory designs'. 
2.1. Vertical power sharing institutions 
In his international comparative analysis, Lijphart (1999) finds two dimensions for distinguishing 
'consensus democracies' from majoritarian 'Westminster democracies': A "horizontal dimension of 
[power sharing] institutions operating at the central level" (treated in the subsequent subsection), 
and a vertical dimension having to do with "central-regional-local government relations" (Lijphart 
2003, 23). Power sharing in the vertical dimension ideally encompasses a federalist constitution that 
is guaranteed by a rigid constitution and enforced through independent judicial review and strong 
representation of the regions in a bicameral parliament, ultimately aiming to promote and protect a 
decentralized system of government (Lijphart 1999, 4). Empirically these federal characteristics of 
power sharing actually clustered in a vertical dimension that was completely unrelated to the cluster 
of horizontal power sharing institutions.
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As Lijphart was concerned with national states, decentralization of power was seen as highest in 
federal states, and unitary states were graded according to their degree of political and 
administrative decentralization – notably, without distinguishing between the local and regional 
level. Comparative local government studies, in contrast, have been preoccupied with local 
                                                          
1
 Lijphart's empirical cluster of federal characteristics also includes the horizontal power sharing institution 
'independent central bank', thus countering his conceptual differentiation between horizontal and vertical 
power sharing institutions (Lijphart 2003, 23). Yet in a factor analysis for a more recent time period and limited 
to 23 modern OECD countires, Adrian Vatter (2009) finds a pattern that is consistent with the distinction 
between a horizontal and a vertical dimension, i.e. central bank independence clusters with the horizontal 
power sharing instituions. 
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autonomy with regard to higher government levels. Hesse and Sharpe (1991) developed a typology 
of centre-local relations and local autonomy in twenty Western industrialised countries which is still 
the basic analytical lens for most comparative studies (see table 1). A more fine-grained comparative 
assessment of decentralization to the local level in 21 countries has been conducted by Sellers and 
Lidström (2007), based on the local share of administrative staff, the share of local tax revenues, 
corporate local representation at higher state levels, supralocal political and administrative 
supervision, dependence on supralocal grants, as well as tax and borrowing autonomy. Yet as we are 
dealing with cities and city regions, vertical power sharing would have to balance municipal authority 
with more or less decentralized neighbourhoods on the one hand side, and more or less authoritative 
regional governments on the other hand side. Regional authority, as measured by Marks, Hooghe, 
and Schakel (2008a; 2008b), implies a representative regional government that is institutionally 
independent from the central government and that has a wide scope of policy competencies, 
including tax competencies. 
TABLE 1: CENTRE-LOCAL RELATIONS AND LOCAL AUTONOMY 
 Franco-group (napoleonic) Anglo-group Northern and Middle 
European group 
Constitutional 
status 
High constitutional status Low constitutional status High constitutional status 
Control from 
above 
Strong control from above Less control in day to day 
policy making 
Less control from above 
Political / 
functional role 
Rather political than 
functional role (cumul de 
mandats) 
More functional than 
political role 
Emphasis on functional 
capacity and local 
democracy per se 
Local autonomy Low degree of local 
autonomy 
Medium degree of local 
autonomy 
High degree of local 
autonomy 
 F, I, E, B, P, GR UK, IRE, CA, AU, NZ, ~US N, S, DK, A, CH, D, NL, JP 
Source: Hesse and Sharpe (1991)  
The problem with looking at regional authority is that urban agglomerations and metropolitan areas, 
defined by strong economic interdependencies and heavy commuting from suburbs to regional 
centres, usually do not correspond with the traditional regional jurisdictions. Adherents of the 
metropolitan government school in the early and mid-20
th
 century have therefore called for the 
establishment of metropolitan governments either through annexation, city-county consolidation or 
the establishment of a new metropolitan tier (e.g. Maxey 1922). In response to the supposedly 
inefficient and unresponsive service delivery by centralized bureaucracies, the public choice school 
from the 1950s onwards saw the fragmentation of local government as a virtue, as inter-local 
competition for mobile taxpayers would lead to tax-service packages matching the local needs (e.g. 
Tiebout 1956; Ostrom, Tiebout, und Warren 1961).  
Concerned by the neglect of questions of equity, scholars of new regionalism have since the 1990s 
focused on forms of metropolitan governance that combine hierarchical forms of strategic decision 
making with horizontal cooperation and coordination (e.g. Rusk 1993; Savitch und Vogel 1996). 
However, the successes of the so called ‘governance without government’ in “reducing the growing 
urban-suburban disparities, enhancing regional growth policies to reduce sprawl, producing 
affordable housing in the suburbs, and leading to a more competitive city in the world economy” 
have been disappointing (Savitch und Vogel 2009, 114). Moreover, Neil Brenner (2002) argued that 
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new regionalists missed the broader context of new regional dynamics. Instead of being experiments 
for strengthening local autonomy and ameliorating the urban crisis, new forms of regional 
governance would reflect a “postfordist urban restructuring and neoliberal (national and local) state 
retrenchment” (Brenner 2002, 3). In his grand theory the rescaling and reterritorialisation of the city-
region is seen as a part of a larger restructuring of statehood in response to the pressures of global 
capitalism (Brenner 2004). This brief sketch of different approaches to metropolitan governance, as 
well as the following overview table, is based on Savitch and Vogel (2009). 
TABLE 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS ON REGIONALISM 
 Metropolitan 
government (Old 
regionalism) 
Public choice  
(Poly-centrism) 
New regionalism Rescaling and 
reterritorialisation 
Time-frame 1900-1960s 1950s-1990s 1990 to present 2006 to present 
Core focus Efficiency Effectiveness Equity City competitiveness 
Pattern of 
urban 
development 
Monocentric Multi-centered but 
core still dominant 
Multi-centered but 
core less dominant 
Megalopolis 
Problem Fragmentation Centralisation Equity/competitiven
ess 
Competitiveness 
Solution Hierarchy: 
Establish 
metropolitan 
government 
Market: Tax 
competition, good 
public services, 
economic 
attractiveness 
Horizontal 
Cooperation: 
Strategic 
metropolitan 
decisions through 
consolidation or 
governance 
arrangements 
Rescaling/ 
Restructuring: 
realignment of 
boundaries, roles, 
functions, and 
resources and 
relations with private 
and non-
governmental actors 
Major 
critique 
May lead to lack of 
responsiveness, 
problem of minority 
dilution 
Lack of equity as 
poor can’t move 
easily 
Weak regionalism, 
unlikely to reduce 
disparities 
Tendency towards 
economic 
determinism, high 
level of abstraction, 
and ‘absence of 
politics’ 
Empirical 
reference 
points 
New York City (1898) 
Toronto (1954) 
Miami (1958) 
London (1965) 
Los Angeles 
(Lakewood Plan) 
St. Louis 
Pittsburgh 
Louisville (1986-
2000) 
Bologna 
Rotterdam 
Portland 
World cities 
Source: Abbreviated version of table in Savitch and Vogel (2009, 108–109) 
In a recent analysis, Daniel Kübler (2012) discusses the metropolitan governments in Lyon, Stuttgart 
and London in terms of vertical (and horizontal, see next section) power sharing. Although all three 
instances represent only a weak form of the metropolitan government tradition (see above), he finds 
a significant variation with regard to the range of policy competencies and planning responsibilities, 
administrative capacities, and financial autonomy. And while the direct election of the Stuttgart 
metropolitan assembly reflects the intention to create an autonomous metropolitan sphere that is 
independent from municipal tyranny, territorial representation through indirect elections and 'cumul 
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de mandats' in the case of Grand Lyon has led to the institutionalization of local-metropolitan 
interdependencies (Kübler 2012). In cities employing new regionalist arrangements instead 
('governance without government'), vertical power sharing might involve delegation of competences 
and resources to a metropolitan governance body or to single-purpose agencies, possibly combined 
with a strategic and supervisory role by higher state levels (see Kübler und Schwab 2007). 
2.2. Horizontal power sharing institutions 
Frank Hendriks (2010) has adapted Lijphart's typology to the local level, by identifying majoritarian 
and consensual characteristics of local governments (table 3). We see that the 'division of local 
power' and 'institutionalized interdependency' clearly relate to the vertical dimension discussed in 
the preceding section. And while the adaption of Lijphart's horizontal characteristics on the party 
system, cabinet, government-legislative relations, electoral system and interest groups is quite 
straight forward, the 'dispersion of regulatory power' within the local administration and the 'legal-
administrative supervision' and 'financial auditing' are meant to replace the power dispersal and 
checks and balances that in Lijphart's national conceptualization might be expected from a bicameral 
system, judicial review and an independent central bank. While this adapted typology was intended 
for the analysis of local governments, important horizontal power sharing institutions can just as well 
be studied with regard to neighbourhood councils and metropolitan governments (for the latter, see 
Kübler 2012).  
TABLE 3: MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 Majoritarian Consensual 
Party system Two-party system  Multiparty system  
Cabinet One-party with simple council 
majority  
Multiparty coalitions  
Government-council relations Executive dominance in monistic 
government  
Balanced relations in dualistic 
government  
Electoral system Majoritarian  Proportional  
Interest groups Pluralism  Local corporatism  
Division of local power Unitary, centralized  Multi-tier and multi-unit  
Division of regulatory power Concentration, vertical lines from 
committees to sectoral 
bureaucracies  
Dispersed, need for horizontal 
coordination of policy sectors  
Local autonomy Home rule, local autonomy  Institutionalized interdependency  
Legal-administrative supervision Limited  Oversight by external bodies  
Financial-economic auditing Under local political control  External ‘courts of audit’  
Source: Hendriks (2010, 55, 72-73) 
To these representative forms of majoritarian and consensus democracy Hendriks (2010) adds two 
direct democratic forms of democracy: a majoritarian 'voter democracy' and a non-majoritarian 
'participatory' or 'deliberative democracy'. Even if decision making in both forms might be by 
majority rule, in the second form a lengthy deliberative process including minorities precedes the 
majoritarian vote which ideally serves to confirm the consensus reached. These four models are not 
seen as mutually exclusive; functioning democracies usually entail different models according to 
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dynamic processes of push and pull (for recent developments in Europe see Hendriks, Loughlin, und 
Lidström 2011).  
The role of referenda for consensus democracies was also a concern for Lijphart, but he could not 
find any association with either of his democracy types (Lijphart 1984; 1999). While referenda are 
often seen as the most extreme majoritarian method of decision-making, potentially repressive of 
minorities, he ascribes them anti-majoritarian traits as they work in addition to the required 
legislative approval, offering dissatisfied minorities the opportunity to launch a campaign against a 
proposed amendment. Even referenda initiated by the population are seen to "give very small 
minorities a chance to challenge any laws passed by the majority of the elected representatives" 
(Lijphart 1999, 231). The potential thread of calling a referendum by minorities is an incentive for 
"the majority to be heedful of minority views", eventually leading to broad governing coalitions and 
the corporatist inclusion of organized interest groups, as evidenced in the case of Switzerland 
(Lijphart 1999, 231).  
In a more recent analysis for 23 advanced OECD countries, Adrian Vatter (2009) conceptually 
disaggregates direct democratic institutions to more or less consensual forms. While plebiscites 
initiated by the government and requiring only a simple majority clearly belong to the majoritarian 
type of democracy, optional referenda and initiatives – both initiated by a minority of voters or 
parliamentary representatives – are seen as typical power sharing institutions as long as they require 
a qualified majority. If a simple majority decision rule applies, these instruments are regarded as 
intermediate forms of power sharing. The same is true for mandatory referenda, as they are not at 
the discretion of the head of government but required by the constitution. Petitions and agenda-
setting initiatives without binding power are also considered to add to the consensual character of 
direct democracy. Empirically, Vatter confirms a close association between the extent of consensual 
direct democracy (including its actual use) and broad government coalitions, constituting an 
additional 'bottom-up dimension' that allows for a more direct democratic type of consensus 
democracy as an alternative to the 'parliamentary-representative' type based on horizontal forms of 
legislative power sharing among multiple parties. Similarly, in a subnational comparative analysis for 
Austria, Germany and Switzerland, Vatter and Steffen-Stadelmann (2013) show that optional 
referenda and popular initiatives at the regional level (all combining minority initiation with majority 
decision-rule) are an important element of consensus democracy and power sharing. 
2.3. Types of urban leadership  
Given the modest resources commanded to local governmental authority in most countries, studies 
of urban governance have stressed the importance of urban political leadership for energetic 
governance (Stone 1995). Even though political leadership can be exercised by a variety of people 
across a city, most studies focus on those people at the top of the formal political institutions as this 
group “has influence over public resources and hence has accountability and power relations with all 
the citizens within the area” (Greasley und Stoker 2009). Key tasks of these political leaders are: 
maintaining political support, developing policy direction, representing and defending the authority’s 
goals in negotiations with other bodies, and ensuring task accomplishment (see Leach u. a. 2005). 
Leader’s success to attain their goals has often been explained by contextual factors and personal 
skills and capabilities, but also by the institutional structure in which they operate. In a comparative 
study of 14 countries Mouritzen and Svara (2002) differentiated four ideal types of governmental 
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forms. In strong mayor systems an elected mayor controls the majority of the city council and is 
responsible for all executive functions. In the committee-leader form the political leader is charged 
with some executive functions, but other functions are assigned to standing committees and to the 
top administrator (CEO, city manager, secrétaire générale or the like). In the collective form there is 
one elected collegiate body that is responsible for all executive functions, where the mayor presides 
over the body. Finally, in the council-manager form, all executive functions are in the hands of a city 
manager who is appointed by the city council, where the mayor is formally assigned presiding and 
ceremonial functions only. The authors note, however, that the governmental form does not 
automatically relate to a strong policy leadership. Instead they find that leaders in strong mayor and 
committee-leader forms are more likely to figure as party leaders bringing their party concerns into 
their role.  
In the earlier mentioned European comparative research project the evidence does not support the 
general hypothesis of enhanced leadership in systems with direct mayoral elections, consolidated 
party systems or strong parliamentary support. Instead it is particular leadership styles (see Getimis 
und Grigoriadou 2005) that are encouraged depending on the institutional and political context (Bäck 
2006). The more fragmented the institutional and political landscape (vertical and horizontal power 
sharing, see above), the more likely are leadership styles that facilitate cooperation and consensus. 
Constitutional arrangements that vest the political leader with high degree of legitimacy through 
direct elections, in contrast, are favourable conditions for a visionary style, where a leader gains the 
support of different sides to promote innovative policies. However, the same constitutional feature 
may also encourage a city boss style, with the political leader promoting his agenda without 
anticipating capacity building in local or regional actors. According to this analysis, a cooperative and 
visionary leadership is thus perfectly compatible with consensual power sharing institutions involving 
the separation of powers ('dualistic government') between a strong council and a collegiate cabinet 
presided by a directly elected mayor – as opposed to a dominating mayor appointed by the winning 
party in a 'monistic council' (Bäck 2005, 82). 
2.4. Participatory designs 
Accounts of urban governance beyond city hall have typically been painted in dark colours. Taking a 
middle ground between elitist and pluralist theories of urban politics, urban regime theory focuses 
on informal governing coalitions forged by urban leaders and senior bureaucrats to include 
resourceful business elites and selected community representatives securing the necessary electoral 
support for pursuing a more or less progressive policy agenda (Stone 1989). Within such an urban 
regime no one would dispose of absolute power, but business power would certainly have a 
privileged position as financial assets can be most readily converted for achieving significant policy 
results. Depending on the composition of this government coalition certain population groups can be 
effectively excluded from power while marginal potential opposition groups may be bought in by 
small-scale material incentives. The formation of stable regime structures, however, is by no means 
certain, and while existing government coalitions in some cities may adapt to changing political 
circumstances, in other cities they may be effectively challenged by newly forming opposition groups 
and protest movements (Mossberger und Stoker 2001). 
In recent years, neo-institutionalism is gaining ground in urban research to complement the 
dominant approach of urban regime theory. In contrast to the discredited old institutionalism, new 
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institutionalism accounts not only for formal institutions, but also for power asymmetries replicated 
by informal conventions and coalitions of governments and bureaucracies (Lowndes 2009). The old 
model of administrations being hierarchically controlled by electorally accountable governments 
seems no longer viable in a context of autonomous and closed governance networks that cannot 
longer be overseen by the legislature, thus rendering public accountability a central challenge (Kjaer 
2009). Administrative agencies and 'street-level bureaucrats' are exposed not only to multiple 
hierarchical principles but they also develop informal ‘decision rules’ emerging from task 
performance as well as ‘attention rules’ that might privilege certain neighbourhoods or population 
groups above others (Jones 1995, 84–85). 
As scholarly attention has moved from the formal institutions of municipal government to the 
opaque and potentially exclusive character of bureaucratic practices, policy networks and 
government coalitions, we may contend with Mark Warren (2009) that the most radical potentials of 
democratisation have also shifted from electoral democracy into democratic governance, the field of 
technocrats and administrators. We may, in fact, be witnesses of a trend that Warren eloquently 
calls ‘governance-driven democratization’. According to Warren (2009, 8), “elected governments 
have become increasingly aware that electoral legitimacy does not translate into policy-specific 
legitimacy.” Initiated from within government and administration, new forms of democratic 
participation have emerged. These are not meant to replace other forms and spaces of democracy 
such as electoral democracy, social movements or deliberation through the media but might be 
supplementary to it (Warren 2009, 8). These new forms are not to be confused with direct 
participation in the form of direct legislation, they are often democratic experiments commonly 
engaging a relatively few citizens and rather have the potential to constitute a means of 
representation of the broader population.  
Archon Fung, a pioneer of democracy research on local participatory processes, lists eight design 
choices that ultimately decide on their contributions to democratic governance (Fung 2003). The first 
design choice informing all the other choices is the vision regarding the purpose of the arrangement, 
where he distinguishes educative forums, participatory advisory panels, participatory problem-
solving collaboration (continuing public-private cooperation), and - the most ambitious - 
participatory democratic governance, aiming at including citizens in agenda-setting and decision 
making to counteract capture of or biases in representative legislation and insular administration. 
Participant selection and recruitment, in this latter form of participatory governance, is not left to the 
biases of voluntary self-selection, but is either (randomly) selected to demographically mirror the 
population or influenced by creating structural incentives for low-status and low-income citizens, 
such as by addressing poor people's concerns (subject of deliberation) so that they can expect that 
participation will make a difference. Ideally, public discussion and decision making is taken in a 
deliberative communication mode, where participants appeal to some common good or common 
norms of fairness. It is most important to encourage disadvantaged participants to form and express 
their opinion as well, and a moderator might level the field and guide the participants toward 
emergent consensus. The motivation to participate as well as the quality of deliberation, in Fung's 
view, is better in hot deliberations with participants who have much at stake. Moreover, 
participatory problem-solving and democratic governance arrangements require a frequent 
recurrence in order to effectively participate in policy development, decision making and ongoing 
monitoring to make officials more accountable and pressuring them to serve public ends or plans. 
Lastly, participatory bodies are empowered to the degree that their deliberative results actually 
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influence public decisions. With regard to just policy outcomes, he regards an incentivized 
recruitment of disadvantaged people and their actual empowerment for deciding and implementing 
policies as absolutely crucial, pointing to participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre as best practice for 
effectively mobilizing low-income people (see also Fung 2006). 
The preceding elaboration of typologies of vertical and horizontal power sharing institutions, of 
urban leadership types and styles, as well as the now added criteria for participatory processes now 
gives us an idea of the huge variation of how actual cities combine these elements in different policy 
fields. Underlying the discussion was also the assumption that vertical and horizontal consensual 
power sharing institutions, complemented with a strong mayor and broadly mobilizing participatory 
arrangements, are best suited for protecting and empowering deprived population groups and 
leading to 'kinder and gentler' or just policies. The next section gives a preliminary idea of how such 
institutions should ideally play out in the particular field of urban planning. 
3. Democratic planning for the Just City 
Departing from the debate on the Just City and the discussion on democratic institutions in the urban 
context, we can now approach the question on the democratic foundations of the Just City. Several 
of the country case studies conducted within the framework of the before mentioned European 
comparative project explicitly deal with urban planning practices that aim at fostering social 
inclusion, regarding mainly neighbourhood redevelopment. In particular they analyse how urban 
leadership and community involvement interact for facing the challenges related to social and 
economic inclusion and spatial justice, thus potentially touching redistributive and complex issues 
requiring the empowerment of disadvantaged population groups and innovative institution building 
(see Haus und Heinelt 2006, 33–37). Even though these case studies give important insights with 
regard to selected neighbourhood planning processes, a rigorous study exploring the democratic 
foundations of the Just City will have to account for the broader planning processes at the municipal 
and metropolitan level as well. 
For the envisaged comparative case study we have developed a preliminary comparative framework 
that is shown in table 4. In the first raw it illustrates the institutional variations between cities with a 
hypothetical example of a city combining strong vertical and horizontal power sharing institutions, 
complemented with a strong mayor and broadly mobilizing participatory processes. The second raw 
includes the planning processes to be investigated in the study. The question of the ideal scale for 
democratically legitimating each of the planning processes, as indicated by the allocation to the three 
columns, will need further discussion, but we take this sorting as a starting point. Note that larger 
mega projects will need to be discussed with regard to the neighbourhood as well as to higher levels, 
as they often affect different constituencies in different ways. 
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TABLE 4: COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTIGATING THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE JUST CITY 
 Neighbourhood level Municipal / intermediary level Level of larger urban 
agglomeration / metropolitan 
area 
Institutional 
arrangements / 
best practices  
 
(assumed as 
the basis for 
democratic 
planning 
processes that 
lead to just 
planning 
outcomes) 
• Judicial provisions: effective 
right to housing, protection 
of tenants, appeals 
procedure, accessible and 
politically independent 
administrative court and 
higher instances  
• Advisory neighbourhood 
council: proportional direct 
election, equal electoral 
rights for foreign residents, 
advisory involvement in 
planning processes, 
initiative rights at municipal 
council 
• Decentralized agency for 
social and community 
work: duty to report to 
head office and advisory 
involvement in planning 
processes  
• Participatory processes 
throughout problem 
definition/ planning/ 
implementation/evaluation; 
inclusion of deprived 
population groups 
(incentives); information 
through independent 
experts; levelled playing 
field with actively 
participating 
mayor/representatives/ 
officials; heated debate with 
external moderator; 
consensual decision making 
(non-binding); active 
information of city-wide 
population; followed by 
binding city-wide popular 
vote (see municipal level) 
 
• Local authority: extensive 
zoning and regulatory 
competences (within the 
bounds of metropolitan 
plans), authority over staff 
and public resources 
required for autonomous 
urban development policies, 
effective right of 
compulsory purchase for 
public use (eminent domain) 
• Directly elected mayor and 
consensual government 
system: multiparty cabinet 
heading administration 
(surplus coalition), extensive 
legislative and controlling 
powers by proportionally 
elected multiparty council 
and its proportionally 
composed committees, 
equal electoral rights for 
foreign residents 
• Direct legislation 
institutions: low barriers for 
binding popular referenda 
and initiatives on legal 
matters and public 
resources, equal 
participation rights for 
foreign residents, decisions 
by simple majority 
• Participatory processes (see 
neighbourhood level) 
• Metropolitan authority: 
extensive planning, 
regulatory and tax 
competences, authority 
over staff and public 
resources required for 
autonomous metropolitan 
development policies  
• Consensual government 
system: multiparty cabinet, 
metropolitan council 
proportionally elected by 
municipal councillors 
according to population size, 
decisions by simple majority 
• Single-purpose agencies 
(special-purpose districts): 
funding and performance 
goals defined and 
supervised by metropolitan 
governance body (see 
above) 
• Participatory processes 
throughout problem 
definition/planning/ 
implementation/evaluation; 
inclusion of deprived 
localities and population 
groups; consensual decision 
making (non-binding); 
followed by binding decision 
by metropolitan council (see 
above) 
• Administrative provisions: objection procedure requiring official response, external evaluations and 
financial audits made available to the public, ombudsman 
 
Planning 
processes 
requiring 
democratic 
legitimation at 
different levels 
for the purpose 
of just planning 
outcomes 
 
(to be 
investigated in 
the study) 
Redevelopment in deprived core 
city neighbourhoods 
• Private redevelopment 
projects 
• Public spaces, green spaces, 
public amenities 
• Mega projects 
Planning decisions in core city 
 
• Zoning, density and building 
regulations, special plans 
• Public land, infrastructure, 
public amenities 
• Mega projects 
Organizing collective action for 
the metropolitan area 
• Strategic development plan, 
structure plan, settlement 
plan 
• Housing supplements / 
social housing 
• Economic development / 
promotion 
• Public transportation 
• Mega projects 
13 
 
Democratic 
qualities of 
planning 
processes 
 
(assumed as 
the basis to just 
planning 
outcomes, to 
be traced back 
to differing 
institutional 
arrangements) 
• Empowered advocacy for 
deprived local population 
groups throughout planning 
processes, capacity for local 
mobilization, differentiated 
media coverage, public 
awareness of planning 
processes 
• Accountable 
administration: planners 
mediating between these 
advocates and higher 
administrative levels, low 
levels of corruption 
• Accountable leadership: 
strong political leadership 
publicly giving account to 
advocates of deprived 
population groups, 
mobilization of material 
resources and popular 
support 
• Inclusive codetermination: 
representatives of deprived 
population groups actively 
involved in agenda setting, 
policy making and decision 
making 
• Capacity for collective 
action: integrated plans and 
strategies, mobilization of 
material resources and 
political support 
• Inclusive codetermination: 
representatives of deprived 
localities actively involved in 
agenda setting, policy 
making and decision making 
Just planning 
outcomes 
 
(to be traced 
back to 
democratic 
qualities of 
planning 
processes) 
• Limiting the displacement of 
deprived population groups 
• Preservation/creation of 
affordable housing 
• Transformation/creation of 
public spaces, green spaces 
and public amenities 
accessible and attractive to 
deprived population groups 
• Limiting spatial 
concentrations of 
economically deprived 
population groups 
• Directing public resources 
towards deprived residential 
areas 
• Limiting the economic 
polarisation between 
municipalities 
• Securing affordable housing 
for low-income residents 
throughout the metro area 
• Securing public 
transportation connecting 
deprived population groups 
with appropriate job 
opportunities 
Expected contribution to social and spatial justice 
• More favourable environment for the personal and professional development of deprived residents 
 
Contextual factors (cp. Savitch und Kantor 2002) 
• Economic/fiscal conditions: economic attractiveness of the city for bargaining with land owners and potential 
developers and investors; public funds/land available for public spaces, green spaces, public infrastructure, public 
amenities and social housing. Fiscal distress weakening the advocates of deprived population groups, undermining 
participatory processes and the responsiveness of political leaders. 
• Political culture: post-materialism, interventionist and solidary attitudes,  and centre-left majorities at different state 
levels, party polarisation across metropolitan area 
 
 
In the third row we list the democratic qualities that are seen as central for achieving just planning 
outcomes (fourth row) at the neighbourhood, municipal and metropolitan level, respectively. The 
idea of the just planning outcomes is to contribute to a more favourable environment for the 
personal and professional development of deprived residents. 
A central part of the analysis concerns the relationship between democratic qualities of single 
planning processes and their democratic foundations. Can the democratic quality and, for that 
matter, just planning outcomes actually be traced back to the broader institutional setting? In what 
instances have vertical or horizontal power sharing institutions and participatory processes impacted 
planning processes and their democratic qualities and just outcomes? To what extent is a particular 
leadership style really conditioned by governmental institutions, and what was its impact on the use 
and design of participatory processes? 
4. Outlook 
The framework presented here is a first draft aiming at taking an encompassing view on how 
democracy might relate the achievement of the Just City. While the existing institutional typologies 
and newer theories of political leadership and participatory processes will serve as a starting point, 
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the overall project will need to refine and systematize the proposed institutional framework, and the 
considerations on the democratic qualities of urban planning processes need to be integrated into a 
more coherent theory of urban democracy. But even a more elaborated framework must remain 
provisional, as long as it is not tested for its usefulness in international comparisons. In a first step, 
we are planning a comparative case study on urban planning processes in the prosperous and 
growing cities of Birmingham, Lyon, Stuttgart and Zurich, thus considering cities from the Anglo-
Saxon, Napoleonic and Northern and Middle European state tradition. Zurich is an interesting case to 
include, as it exhibits the very Swiss consensual and direct democratic traits, complemented with a 
directly elected mayor but strong reservations against empowering participatory processes (Crivelli 
and Dlabac 2006) and affording political rights to foreign residents. 
With regard to institutions of metropolitan governance, Zurich and Birmingham both cities lack the 
consolidated metropolitan institutions found in Lyon and Stuttgart (see Kübler 2012). The Greater 
Zurich Area is particularly affected by institutional fragmentation (132 communes and intermunicipal 
tax competition). Metropolitan governance for Zurich is pursued through purpose-oriented 
coordination schemes (Kübler and Schwab 2007), e.g. for mass transit (majority votes), tax 
equalization schemes imposed by the regional government, water provision by the central 
municipality (majority voting confined to central city) or services for drug users (consensus decision 
making). 
The comparative analysis of urban planning processes will to great extent rely on qualitative 
assessments, mainly applying the process-tracing method to relate the planning outcomes and the 
qualities of planning processes to different institutional arrangements and their particular design. In 
order to widen the scope for future analysis we plan to define political-institutional indicators that 
can be collected for a wider range of European (and other) cities. Also for our just planning outcomes 
we will try to find quantifiable measures to complement our qualitative analysis. Possible data 
sources are: comparative data on laws and institutions, party competition, political participation; 
data on elections and direct legislation; content analysis of media coverage; survey data; and expert 
interviews. The single case studies and the comparative analysis will help to critically test and re-
specify the comparative framework.  
We believe that it is possible to give democracy a meaning for the Just City. The envisaged 
comparative case study will hopefully contribute to a realistic assessment of the opportunities and 
limitations offered by democratic institutions and planning processes for approaching the ideal of the 
Just City. 
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